By Alan Vick
Identifies strategies and applied sciences which could enhance the USA Air Force's strength to realize, classify, realize, and defeat elusive objectives, even if dispersed flooring forces or cellular ballistic missles.
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Extra info for Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets
This availability would also avoid severely straining aircrews or putting them at risk as they orbit over areas where there may be hidden mobile SAMs. 34 Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets guided bombs (LGBs), or what we call a Man-In-the-Loop, Variableautonomy, Anti-armor Weapon (MILVAW). SFW (CBU-97) is a widearea guided munition capable of destroying multiple armored vehicles in a single pass. It would be an appropriate weapon for engaging a group of military vehicles at a safe distance from civilians.
Before early 1998, the NATO powers had been reluctant to interfere in an internal Yugoslav affair and had shown little inclination to help Kosovar Albanians or even to address the problem of Kosovo. They became involved only when the repression, especially depopulation of entire villages and episodic massacre of the male inhabitants, became impossible to ignore. Throughout the conflict, NATO’s first goal was to end this violence and repression. In April, the NATO powers issued their Statement on Kosovo,16 beginning as follows: The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
S. d. ”21 But air power alone could not stop Yugoslav forces from perpetrating crimes in Kosovo, as senior Air Force leaders realized. General Short preferred to minimize efforts against fielded forces in Kosovo because he expected poor results: “We couldn’t stop the killing in Kosovo from the air. ”22 General John P. S. ” 24 Inadequate Planning Even though the Kosovo crisis developed slowly and gave ample warning, NATO neither planned nor prepared adequately for Operation Allied Force. For political reasons, NATO planned and prepared for a short air operation against a small target set (Limited Air Response), apparently based on the optimistic assumption that Belgrade would capitulate quickly.